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I TRODUCTIO
In the first footnote of her chapter, Lea Brilmayer mentions "significant ove rlap" with two recent papers of mine. If anyone should be making acknowledgments, I should . She has long argued that the law of choice of law, even in its modern interest-analysis incarnations, is a disguised form of general common law, and that it o ught to be reformed in the spirit of Erie.
1 In taking up this argument myself, I am in her debt.
2
To get the basic idea, consider a varia tion on Kuchinic v. McCrory ) Ass ume a Georgia pilot invites another Georgian to Ay with him to attend a football game in ew York. On the way the plane crashes in Pennsylvania. A Georgia statute prohibits guests from suing their hosts for negligence. Pennsylvan ia law has no such prohibition. Had it enterta ined the action, the G eorgia Supreme Court would have applied Pennsylvan ia law to the facts . However, the guest chooses to sue the host in Vermont state court instead. May it apply Georgia law? Under every choice-of-law approach currently used by state co urts -from the First Restatement to mode rn interest analys is-the mere fact that the G eorgia Supreme Court would not apply Georgia law does not prohibit the forum from doing so. A state supreme court's refu sal to apply its law to interjuri sdictional fac ts does not bind sister states. ' Indeed, she is probably the first to make thi s argum ent. Lea Brilmayer, "Methods and Ob jectives in the Con Aict of Laws: A C hallenge," Mercer Law Review 35 (1984) : 555-563, precedes umy Kramer, "Return of the Renvoi ," New York University Law Review 66 (1991 ): 979-1044. ' I a lso owe a debt to Larry Kramer and particula rly to Kim Rooseve lt, who e article Kern1it Roosevelt Ill, "Resolving Renvo i: Th e Bewitchment of Our Inte lligence by M eans of Language,"
Notre Dame l .aw Review So (2005) : 1821-1891, started me thinking about these matters. l See 422 Pa. 6zo (1966) .
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is common ly understood as standing for the
propos iti on that a state supreme court is the auth ority on that state's law.4 Beca use it is hard to see wh y this authority would evaporate when the question is th e applicability of the state's law to interjurisdictional facts, it looks like the Ve rmont state co urt must respect the G eorgia Supre me C ourt's dec ision not to apply G eorgia law. T his duty of deference is not merely part of proper conflicts law; it is a constitu tional obliga tion , appli ca ble to th e Vermont state court by means of th e F ull Faith and Credit C lause.5 (We can call this obligation "hori zonta l Erie," to di stinguish it from its ve rtical equi va lent.)
One te rmi nological quibbl e: As Professor Brilmaye r desc ribes it, respec ting a state supre me court's c ho ice-of-law dec isions am ounl·s to accepting renvo i. I di sagree. Under the doctrine of renvo i, th e Vermont state court should app ly Pennsylvania law, because that is the law that wou ld be c hosen by the Geo rgia ~See Erie Railroad v. '/' ompkin, , 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . ; I mgue that federal co urts' v:rie obligations apply hori zontally, by mea ns of th e Full Fa ith and C redit C lause, to sta te courts inte rpreti ng siste r state law in Part II of Michae l Steven Green , "Hori zo ntal Erie and the Presumpti on of Forum Law," Michigan Law Review 109 (2011 ): 1237-1291 (he reinafter Green, " Horizontal"). I furth e r mgue th<lt horizont< l i Erie compel s a state court to respect sister state choice-of-law dec isions wh en dete rm ining whethe r sister state law appli es in Pa rt IV of Mi chael Steven G reen, "Erie's Suppressed Premise," Minnesota Law Review 95 (2011 ): 1111-11 69 (he re ina fter G reen , "S uppressed"). Kim Rooseve lt gives a sim ilar a rgument at Roosevelt, "Resolving Re nvoi," 1841 , 1856-1857. As Professor Bri lmayer m akes clear in he r reply, howeve r, I should not have attributed these views to her. She is agnosti c a bout wheth er a co nstitutional du ty to defe r to a siste r sta te's choice-of-law decisions exists.
Alth o ugh anyo ne skepti ca l abo ut the idea ofh ori zontal/•:rie sho uld examine my argument in G reen, "H o rizonta l," I would li ke to bri e Ry defe nd my positi on in th e face of the disa na logies Professo r Bri lmaye r identifies between ve rtica l l•:rie a nd the Full Fa ith and C redit C lause. She is quite right that verti ca l l<rie o bliga tes a federa l court sitting in di ve rsity to use the forum state's statute of limitati ons (or, m ore accurate ly, the limitations that wo uld be used by a forum state co urt) and no comparab le hori zo ntal obl iga ti on arises und e r the F ull Fa ith and C redit C lause. Noneth eless, a dist·incti on should be drawn between the constituti onal and the no nconstitutionall <rie doctrines. G ree n, "Horizontal," S !.1 ; see also Byrd v. Blue l{idge Rural Elec. Coup., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 , 535-537 (1958) I anna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 46o, 467-468 (1965 ) . My argume nt in G ree n, " Hori zontal," is th<ll on ly th e constituti onal Erie doctrine has its horizontal equi va lent in the Fu ll Fa ith a nd C redit C lause.
Professor Bri lmayer is a bso lu tely right, however, tha t th e Full Fa ith a nd C red it C lause ca nnot obliga te a state court to respect a sister state's choice-of-law rules if these ru le a re conce ived of as procedura l, along the lines of statutes of li mitati ons. Anoth er very important di fference betwee n us, the refore, is that, like Larry Kramer a nd Kim Roosevel t, I think that choice-of-law ru les can be substanti ve. See G reen, "Suppressed," Part· IV; Krame r, "Retu rn ," 1043-1044; Roosevelt, " Resolving Renvo i," 1883. Supreme Court. 6 However, renvo i itself looks incompatible with horizon tal Erie, beca use the choice of Pennsylva nia law is made without regard for the decisions of the Pennsylvan ia Supreme Court. Proper defe rence to the Georgia Supreme Court is shown by concluding not that Pennsylva nia law applies, but only that Georgia law does not.
I agree with Professo r Brilmaye r that horizontal Erie compels the forum to defer to a state supre me court's c hoice-of-law dec isions when dete rmining whether the state's law applies.7 Nonetheless, I'm not going to defend our position here. My goal is the more modest one of identifying two obstacles tha t our position must overcome. The first, of which I am sure Professor Brilmayer is aware, is that deference can genera te puzzles when two state supreme courts wou ld apply one another's law . Th e second obstacle is, I think, even more serious: Lack of deference to a state supreme court's cho ice-of-law decisions might be compatible with hori zontal Erie, for th e simple reason that the state supreme court doesn 't want deference.
After describing these two obstacles, I'll end by making a few observations about two different themes in Professor Brilmaye r's chapter: her advocacy of the common law method in choice ofla w and her worry that choice of law is necessarily committed to some "unid entified Archimedean va ntage point. "
TH E PUZZLE OF MUTUAL DEFERENCE
Let us ass ume that sister states must always respec t a state supreme court's dec ision not to apply its law. So our Vermont state court cannot apply Georgia law if the Georgia Supreme Court would apply Pennsylvania law. But what if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply Georgia la w? It looks like the Vermont court is prohibited from applying both Pennsylvan ia and Georgia law. How shoul.d it respond to this legal void, given that it pro bably lacks the power to fil l it wi th Vermont law?
One possibility is that it should dismiss for failure to state a claim . 8 However, isn't that still the applicati on of law (in effec t, Georgia law)? After all , doesn 't dismissal for failure to state a claim mean that th e plaintiff is not lega lly en titled to relief? Perhaps it should instead dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, without getting to the merits.
Is it reall y true, however, that the supre me co urts of Geo rg ia and Pennsylvania have decided that th e ir laws do not appl y to th e fac ts? W eren't th e ir dec isions predi ca ted on an error (indeed , a constit·utionally prohibited error), namely that the law of th e oth er state could be applied ? If, however, eac h state suprem e court has no t ye t dec ided the matte r, how is th e Ve rmont court to determin e how th ey will dec ide it, given that th e dec i ion of eac h depend cruc ially on what the oth er will do?
It may be beca use of th e puzzle of mutual deference tha t Professor Brilmaye r says that ren voi is a "useful tool," rather than an infallibl e guide, to th e scope of sister state law. Like Larry Krame r and Kim Roosevelt, she may be arguing that a state supre me court's c ho ice-of-law dec isions onl y sometimes bind sister states. As Kramer and Roosevelt understand it, c ho ice-of-law rules come in two fl avo rs: rules of priority and rul es of scope.9 If a sta te supre me co urt c hooses not to apply its own la w, it·s dec ision binds siste r states only if it was based on a rule of scope.
Con icie r a state supre me court empl oying inte re I analys is. If it concludes that no forum interest would be adva nced by applying its law, it employs a rule of scope. It is saying, in effect, that th e fac ts do not fall under its law. Beca use, uncler hori zontal Erie, it is the authority on th e matter, its dec ision binds sister sta tes . However, Kramer and Roosevelt argue, wh en it chooses anoth er state' law beca use it thinks that state's inte rests are greater than its own, its decision does not bind sister states .' 0 It has not held that its la w does not apply to the fac ts, only that its law, despite applying, should not be given priori ty to the law of th e other state . Sister states are entitl ed to ha ve th eir own views on that questi on.
Krame r and Roosevelt di sagree about wheth e r the traditi onal approac h, as exe mplified in the First Restate ment, consists of rules of pri ority or rules of scope . Kra mer thinks the traditional approac h ass umes that the fac ts are within th e scope of th e compe ting states' laws simply by undertaking th e c hoice-oflaw inquiry. As a res ult, th e First Res tatem ent consists of rul es of pri ori ty and a tate supre me court's adoption of th e First Restatement does not bind sister states ." 9 T he tenm are Roosevelt's. Ibi d., 187 1. ' 0 Although it was inAuenced by interest analysis, they both argue that th e Second Restatemen t consists onl y of rul es of priority, because it does not have an expli cit two-step inq ui ry in which state in te rests are fi rst identi fied and then con Ai cts between th ose in terests are resolved. In contrast, Roosevelt argues that historically the traditional approach saw choice-of-law rules as enforc ing preexisting limits on states' law-making power.'
2 If a First Restatement court refuses to apply its tort law to an accident because it occurred out of state, it has concluded that its law cannot apply (even though it might in fact have law-making power as a constitutional matter). Beca use the First Restatement consists of rules of scope, a state supreme court's decision to adopt it binds sister states.' 3 Krame r and Roosevelt's approach would solve our puzzle of mutual deference if the Georgia Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied one another's law as a result of rules of priority, not rules of scope. In such a case, the Vermont court would be free to use its own rules of priority to choose between Pennsylvania and Georgia law. Indeed, it could choose Georgia law even if the Pennsylvania and Georgia Supreme Courts' rules of priority agreed that Pennsylvania law should be applied.
onetheless, Kramer and Roosevelt's approach cannot solve the problem of two state supreme courts that refuse to apply their own law as a result of rules of scope. Assume that the Georgia Supreme Court wouldn't apply Georgia law because it accepts the First Restatement; further ass ume that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, employing interest ana lys is, wou ldn't apply Pennsylva nia law because it thinks Pennsylvania has no interest. If Roosevelt is right about the First Restatement consisti ng of rules of scope, then the Vermont state court is once again faced with a legal void.'4
. IS THE CE ERAL COMMON LAW I COMPATIBLE WITH ERIE?
The puzzle of mutual deference is not the only obstacle that must be overcome by any approach that demands deference for state supreme courts' choice-oflaw decisions. There is another obstacle that is even more serious.
As Professor Brilmayer accurately describes it, prevailing choice-of-law approaches are urreptitiously committed to the general common law. applica bility of Georgia law to interjurisdictional facts beca use Georgia law (a t leas t in its territorial scope) is treated like the general common law was in Swift v. Tyson. T he obstacle is this: T he Swifl"ian conception of th e general common law was probably compatible with re pect for state supreme co urt dec isions concern ing th e common law applicable in the tate-if such respec t is understood as giving these dec isions the binding effect th eir crea tors wan ted them to have. The sa me thing is also LTUe of th e Swiftian general co mmon law of choice of law.
Swift concerned th e appropriate common law rule to apply to a bill of exc hange that had been accept ed in ew York . As we all kn01 , Justice Story did not cons ider himself bound by th e dec isions of ew York tate courts on t·he matter. One reason, howeve r, was that New York state courts did not think their decisions bound federal (or sister state) courts. As Story put it, "It is observable, that the courts of New York do not found th eir dec isions upon this point, upon any local statute, or positi ve, fixed or anc ient loca l usage; but they deduce the doctrine from th e general principles of commercial law."'5 Story thought he was L Tea ting ew York decisions exactly the way that their creators wanted them to be trea ted. How can that be incompatible with Erie?
I think that Story was right that New York state courts did not expect their general common law dec isions to bind sister state and federal courts. The best evid ence is the way they would have decided a general common law case arising in a sister state, such as Pennsylvan ia. Like th e federal court in Swift, they would have ignored th e dec isions of Pennsylvania state courts. ' 6 This suggests that th ey th ought th eir own dec isions on th e general common law were not binding on federal or sister state courts either.'?
The sa me point applies to the general common law of choice of law. All state supreme courts ignore th e choice-of-law dec isions ofs i ter states when deciding wheth er sister state law can be appli ed. That suggesl·s th at th ey think their own choice-of-l aw dec isions can be ignored by si ter state courts. '/13ank, 27 N.E. 849,851 (N.Y. 189 1) . ' 8 Professo r Brilmaye r suggests th< Jt a state supreme co urt, thinking that it has gotten th e principles of the com mon law right , might demand that si ter states foll ow its dec isions, even though it ignores th e dec isions of sister states. I think it is entirely possibl e that a state su preme court might hold such l l view. Indeed in Green, ''S uppressed," Sl.l, I argue that the proper method of howi ng deference to state supreme co urt decisions is a stale-by-slate approach, in wh ich the choice-of-law dec isions of a sta te supreme court, preva iling approaches to choice of law give these dec isions exactly the deference that the ir creator intends them to have (namely none).'9
THE COMMON LAW METHOD
Let us set as ide these two obstacles to consider two other important the mes in Professor Brilmaye r's chapter. The first is her endorsement of wha t she calls "the common law method " in choice oflaw. (I'll call it "the method" for short. )
As I understand her, the method describes how a state court determines the applicability of domestic law. Rather than answering the question by reference to a priori principles of legislative jurisdiction (as the First Restatement does) or to essentially unan werable questions oflegislative intent (per interest analysis), it should decide whether its law applies on the basis of precisely the sa me sort of ethical concerns that it uses when making domestic common law in other areas. Here I think she has, with one possible exception, go tten things exac tl y right.
As Brilmaye r herself recognizes, tl1e method is more of a description of what courts are doing, rather than what they ought to do . Because th e metl1od has room for "vested rights and state interests," all state courts have arguably already been using the method, despite themselves. However, that does not mean that accepting the method would have no consequences, for it gives state deference is ta ilored to what the re levant state supreme court wants. T hat the Penn sylvani a Supreme Court refu ses to defer to sister states' dec isions does not mea n that its decisions ca n be ignored, for it may demand deference. evertheless, l think that it is clear that states committed to the general common law did not hold such a view. The reason is that the very idea of th e genera l common law was of a standard that could not be fixed by state (or federal) cou rt decisions. ln the exa mple Professor Brilmayer envisions, in which th e Pennsy lva nia Supreme Court demands deference to its dec isions, it is denying that the general common law applies in Pennsylva ni a. The evidence that state courts did not consider their decisions binding on sister states is particularly strong with respec t to choice of law. As Professor Bri lmaye r per uasively demonstrates, under both the Fi rst Re tatement and interest analysis, a sister state's choice-Qf-law decisions are not binding on th e forum when it decides wheth er sister state law appli es. States that adopt th e First Restatement or interest analysis-without some cavea t that this lack of deference should not apply to their own choice-Qf-law decisions-must have li censed sister states to ignore th eir decisions. lt is particul arly revea ling that no state court using th e Fir t Restatement or interest analysis has, to my knowledge, ever complained that sister states were ignoring its choice-Qf-law dec i ions. '9 l believe that this obstacl e ca n be overcome on ly by arguing that Erie limi ts a state supreme court's abili ty to free sister state (and federal ) courts of the duty to defer to its dec isions. For a disc u sion, see Creen, "'Su ppressed," Part ll.
courts grea ter freedom in the choice-of-law arena than they currently think they have. They could continue their adherence to th e First Restatement or orthodox interest analys is, but they do not have to.
Because she describes the method as taking into account, inter alia, "the substantive policy (actual or pres umed) of the laws vying for applica tion," it might appear as if it is used by the fomm to determine the applicability of sister state law as well. However, wh en assess ing sister state law, the forum has none of the freedom that it has in connection with dom es tic law. It can apply sister state law only if th e sister state's supreme court (using its own version of th e method ) would say that sister state law applies. The point is merely that the fomm , in deciding whether its own law should be used, can take into account sister state interests.
l think Brilmayer herself may have slipped, however, when desc ribing how the forum should determine the existence and slTength of these sister state interests, for she appears to think that conceiving of them objectively -that is, in a manner ind ependent of the dec isions of th e sist·er state's courts -is contrary to th e lesson of Erie. Here is how she puts it:
Wh en cons idering the interests of oth er states under the co mmon law method, however, a judge acts with the awareness that a state's law is nothing more than wha t the state courts say it is. She or he should not assess the other state's definition of its interests for obj ec tive validi ty, but instead accept that definiti on on the grounds that each state formulates and interprets its own laws. I think thi s is a mistake. There is nothing wrong with an objec tive determination of sister state int erests, provided that it is being used to determine whether domestic law should be applied.
To see why this is th e case, consider th e actual fa cts in Kuchinic v. McCrory. 20 One Pennsylvanian invited another to Ay with him to a football game in Florida . 21 The plane crashed in Georgia. 22 Once aga in , a Georgia guest statute wou ld have barred the plaintiff's ac tion , and Pennsylva nia law wou ld have allowed it.
2 3 In Kuchinic, th e negligence suit aga inst the pilot was be ing entertained by a Pennsylvania state court, wh ic h used interest analys is to apply Pennsylva nia law to the fac ts."~ The co urt's dec ision was defended by Peter Westen on th e bas is of an objec tive conception of sister sta te interests. The fact that a Georgia co urt 20 See 422 Pa . 620 (1966 would employ Georgia law to th e fac ts, he argued, does not mean that Georgia is really intere ted:
[l]f the forum dec ides that a foreign state is interested in a case by looki ng to that state's conflicts law, it subordinates its own choice of law to that of a foreign state, however archaic the latter may be. To do so fru strates the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Instead, as C urrie himself adm itted, the forum should ass ume final responsibility for dec iding whether another tate is properl y interested in th e facts at issue. The forum ultimately makes such a finding not by asking whether the foreign state declares itself to be interested, but rath er by asking whether-in light of forum poli cythat declared interest seems reasonable. Ultimately, the forum imputes those policies to a foreign law which it could conceive a rational foreign court adopting, were that foreign court deciding the case at hand .'S Both Kramer and Roosevelt have criticized Westen here,'
6 and it appears that Brilmayer would as well. Nonetheless, in the context of a Pennsylvania court's decision about whether it hould apply Pennsylvania law, Westen's comments are correct. The court is not bound by what Georgia courts might say about Georgia interes ts. 1t is free to conclude that Georgia has no real interes t and thus that Pennsylvania law should be applied.
Of course, if the question is whether it is permitted to apply Georgia law, a reliance on ob jective interests is misguided. A Pennsylvania court may not point to Georgia's objective interest as a reason to apply Georgia law when th e Georgia Supreme Court has sa id Georgia law does not apply. In such a case, however, the mistake is not rea lly claiming that Georgia has an interest when it does not, but applying Georgia law when the Georgia Supreme Court has sa id its law does not apply. Now as an advoca te of a particular version of the method, with its own distinctive conception of sister state interests, Brilmayer is free to insist that the forum should defer to a sister state supreme court's dec isions when determining whether the sister state has an interest. However, she ca nnot claim that this conception of sister state interests foll ows from hori zontal Erie. not grounded in positive law may be an unavoidabl e fact of life for choice-oflaw dec ision making." C hoice-of-law doctrine see ks to provide a "meaningful choice" between two com peting states' laws -one that does not beg the question to be dec ided-and that requires so me "unidentifi ed Archimedean va ntage point. " The law of choice of law st·< nts looking like general com mon law after all . Or, at th e very leas t, it cannot be solely positive law. Here I'd like to defend Professor Brilmayer aga inst herself. Consid er, once aga in , our Vermont state co urt's choosing between Georgia and Pennsylvan ia law. Let· u assum e, however, that th e Geo rgia Supreme Court wo uld have appli ed Georgia law and th e Pennsylva nia Supreme Court would have appli ed Pennsylvania law. Under horizonta l Erie, th e Vermont court is free to choose whi ch law appli es. Brilmayer claims that in making a choice between two states' laws, " [ t] he only pos itive law sources to turn to ... are the two states whose domes tic substantive laws are under consideration. " However, that is clearly fal se here. The relevant principles on the basis of which t·he court would choo e are part of th e positive law of Vennont.
Of co urse, in creating and employing this law, the Vermont co urt hopes to track independent norms. For example, it might seek to apply the law of the state that has the greater interest-and whether Georgia or Pennsylvania has a grea ter interest is not something over which Verm ont has authori ty. But any law worth its salt seeks to trac k independent norms. Law is crea ted for reasons and its crea tors hope that th ey have gotten the reasons right. Vermont's law of choice of law is no more metaphysically committed than any other Vermont law is.
Perhaps the probl em bothering Brilmayer arises wh en a court chooses between its own law and th e law of a sister state. Let us return to Kuchinic, in which th e Pennsylvan ia Supreme Co urt is consid ering wh ether to apply Pennsylva nia or Georgia law. To the ex tent that it is choosing in this case, it appea rs that it must be standing outside th e very law over which it has authority.
The pu zzle might be put· thi way. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the auth ority concerning the territorial scope of Pennsylvania law. However, when engaging in choice-of-law reasoning, it arguably seeks to occ upy a perspec tive oth er than that of th e expos itor of the scope of Pennsylvania law. It seeks to choose between Pennsylvania law and Georgia law.
On the one hand , even if it does seek to occ upy thi s perspective, l do not see why that means that there is so me una vo idabl e metaphys ics of cho ice. Under Kramer and Roosevelt's approac h, for exa mpl e, if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concludes that the facts fall under th e scope of Pennsylvania law (a nd it predicts that the Georgia Supreme Co urt would say th e sa me abou t Georgia law), it is free to choose, on th e bas is of a rul e of priority, between
